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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann., §78-2-2(3)(j) and 
the Utah Constitution Article VIII §3. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues presented by this appeal are as follows: 
1. Did the appellate court obtain jurisdiction of this matter upon the filing of the 
Notice of Appeal and is "plain error" the appropriate standard of review where: 
a. Appellants made a Motion for a New Trial based upon jury bias, but 
passed the jury for cause; 
b. After denial of the Motion for a New Trial, appellants filed a Motion to 
Reconsider based upon Utah Rule of Evidence 103(d), the "plain error" rule and U.C. A. 
§78-7-24, authority of the courts, claiming insufficient voir dire, but refusing to 
characterize their Motion to Reconsider as a Motion for a New Trial (Appellants' Brief 
p. 28); 
c. Before obtaining a ruling on the Motion to Reconsider, appellants filed a 
Notice of Appeal, divesting the trial court of jurisdiction? 
2. Was the claimed error in the jury voir dire so obvious and harmful, it reached the 
level of "plain error" when the claim is based upon pre-trial publicity about the defendant 
hospital and appellants' counsel passed the jury for cause? 
When appellants filed their Notice of Appeal, that action divested the trial court of 
jurisdiction. Therefore, that trial court had no authority to entertain Appellants' Motion for 
Reconsideration on the issues it raised. "[T]he concept of plain error . . . allows an appellate 
court to reach the merits of a claim raised for the first time on appeal." Steele v. Bd. of Rev. 
of Indus. Com'n, 845 P.2d 960, 962 n.2 (Utah App. 1993). 
Appellants claim that if the trial court had jurisdiction to consider their Motion for 
Reconsideration, the standard of review would be an abuse of discretion, based on the courts 
denial of Appellants' Motion for a New Trial. (Appellants' Brief p. 2). However, Appellants' 
Brief does not address Appellants' Motion for a New Trial in the issues it presents. The only 
issue presented for review by appellant is whether the jury voir dire was adequate based upon 
exposure to pre-trial publicity. (Appellants' Brief p. 1). This issue was only in Appellants' 
Motion for Reconsideration and appellant has refused to characterize its Motion for 
Reconsideration as another Motion for a New Trial. (Appellants' Brief p. 28). In either event, 
this appeal is subject to a "plain error" standard of review because appellants' counsel passed 
the jury for cause. State v. Brooks. 868 P.2d 818, 821 (Utah App. 1994) (R. 617). (See 
Exhibit A attached and by this reference made a part hereof). 
The first requirement for a finding of plain error is that the error 
be "plain", i.e., from our examination of the record we must be 
able to say that it should have been obvious to a trial court that it 
was committing error, (citations omitted). The second and 
somewhat interrelated requirement for finding of plain error is that 
the error affect the substantial rights of the accused, i.e., that the 
error be harmful. 
State v. Eldredge. 773 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah 1989). Even if the court concludes that the 
trial court made an obvious error, it need "not reverse unless [the party] demonstrates that, 
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absent the error, there is a sufficient likelihood of a different result." State v. Brooks, 868 P.2d 
at 821. This means a substantial likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the challenging 
party. Id. at 822. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
This court's interpretation of the following rules and statute as they affect the jurisdiction 
of the trial court and the tolling of the time for appeal will have an impact on those issues in this 
case. 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b): 
Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court by any 
party (1) for judgment under Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to 
amend or make additional findings of fact, whether or not an 
alteration of the judgment would be required if the motion is 
granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the judgment; or (4) 
under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all parties 
shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or 
granting or denying any other such motion . . . A notice of appeal 
filed before the disposition of any of the above motions shall have 
no effect. A new notice of appeal must be filed within the 
prescribed time measured from the entry of the order of the trial 
court disposing of the motion as provided above. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b): 
Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple 
parties. When more than one claim for relief is presented in an 
action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-
party claim, an/or when multiple parties are involved, the court 
may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but 
fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express 
determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay 
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and upon an express direction for the entry ot judgment In the 
absence of such determination and direction, any order or other 
form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates tewer 
than all the claims or the nghts and liabilities of claims or parties, 
and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at 
any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims 
and the nghts and liabilities of all the parties 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b): 
Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered 
evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, 
the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his 
legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding 
for the following reasons (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect, (2) newly discovered evidence which by due 
diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a 
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore 
denominated intrinsic or extrinsic, misrepresentation or other 
misconduct of an adverse party; (4) when, for any cause, the 
summons in an action has not been personally served upon the 
defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has failed to 
appear in said action, (5) the judgment is void, (6) the judgment 
has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment 
upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or 
it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective 
application, or (7) any other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a 
reasonable time and for reasons, (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more 
than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was 
entered or taken A motion under this Subdivision Co) does not 
affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation This 
rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent 
action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or 
to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure 
for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as 
prescribed in these rules or by an independent action (Emphasis 
added.) 
4 
Utah Code Annotated 30-3-5(3): 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent 
changes or new orders for the support and maintenance of the 
parties, the custody of the children and their support, maintenance, 
health, and dental care, or the distribution of the property and 
obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the case. 
This is an alleged malpractice claim brought against Dr. Robert O. Murray and the Grand 
County Service Area, dba Allen Memorial Hospital, by appellants for the death of their child, 
two hours after birth. (R. 1-4). Appellants dismissed their claims against defendant Robert O. 
Murray and continued their action against the hospital. (R. 20-21). The parties went to trial 
in this posture. 
n . Course of proceedings and disposition. 
At the conclusion of a five day trial, the jury entered a verdict of no cause of action 
against defendant Allen Memorial Hospital. (R. 418-20). (Exhibit B). Appellants filed a 
Motion for a New Trial based on jury bias, which was denied by the court. (R. 431-39; 457-
58). Appellants filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the order denying their Motion for a New 
Trial. (R. 504-5). This Motion for Reconsideration was also denied by the court. (R. 534-39). 
Before the trial court ruled on Appellants' Motion for Reconsideration, appellants filed their 
Notice of Appeal. (R. 529). 
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III. Statement of facts. 
1. Appellant Michele Davis contacted her attorney John Black and informed him of 
her concerns for obtaining a fair trial in Moab because "everyone knows everyone". (R. 485-
86). (Exhibit C). 
2. On August 17, 1993 appellant Michele Davis sent her attorney another letter 
showing a "fear of having a trial take place in Moab". (R. 487-88). (Exhibit D). 
3. No motion for change of venue was ever filed with the court and appellants 
retained their attorney up to and throughout the trial. (R. 159, 239). 
4. During jury voir dire, after defense counsel's objections, the court changed the 
words on No. 11 and 12 of Appellants' Proposed Voir Dire Questions from "about" to "for or 
against". (R. 550, 553). The court disallowed questions No. 17 and 20 (R. 553, 261-62) and 
questions No. 25 and 28. (R. 558, 262-63, 398) (See Exhibit E for Appellants' Proposed Voir 
Dire Questions and the court's minute entry). 
5. Appellants' counsel noted no exception to the court's ruling on voir dire. 
THE COURT: Any exceptions to be noted, Mr. Black? 
MR. BLACK, JR.: No, your Honor. (R. 555). (Exhibit F). 
6. The court asked all of Appellants' Proposed Voir Dire Questions that had been 
allowed except No. 13 regarding the magazines to which jurors subscribed. The questions asked 
included whether or not the parties had been sued or had brought a suit against anyone (R. 609), 
whether the jurors had feelings for or against someone bringing a lawsuit against their doctor 
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or hospital (R. 610), and whether any juror acquired any information about the parties which 
would bias them for or against any of the parties (R. 600). (Exhibit G; See also, Index of 
Questions Asked, Exhibit H). 
7. A number of jurors were excused for cause during the voir dire, based upon 
objections by counsel for both sides. (R. 398, 574, 577, 584, 587, 593). (Exhibit I). 
8. Appellants' counsel made no objection to the court when the court did not ask 
question No. 13 regarding magazine subscriptions. 
THE COURT: Any-anything that I've skipped over, gentlemen? 
MR. BLACK, SR.: I can't think of anything that your Honor has 
missed. (R. 611). (Exhibit J). 
9. Both counsel for appellant and appellee passed the jury for cause. 
THE COURT: Oh, thank you. And I will. Mr.-Do you pass the 
jury for cause at this time, Mr.— 
MR. BLACK, JR.: We do your Honor. 
MR. JEFFS: We pass the jury for cause your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. (R. 617). (Exhibit A). 
10. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of defendant Allen Memorial Hospital for no 
cause of action. (R. 418-20) (Exhibit B). 
11. Of all the newspaper articles submitted by appellants in the their brief regarding 
the defendant Allen Memorial Hospital, only the one dated September 23, 1993 (misdated in 
Appellants' Brief p. 8 as September 19), makes any reference to the cost of malpractice suits 
(R. 497). (Exhibit K). In the last paragraph of that article, it notes that senior citizens who 
attended the luncheon, which is the subject of this article, had several concerns about the 
hospital, including rising costs due to malpractice suits, need for local insurance, high 
staff-to-patient ratios, low patient occupancy, lack of information to the public, the need for a 
hospital, and the possibility of part of Moab City's local sales tax being earmarked for health 
care. (Exhibit K). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This case should be reviewed under a "plain error" standard because the Appellants' 
Notice of Appeal divested the trial court of jurisdiction to consider the Appellants' Motion for 
Reconsideration. This is the general rule the Utah courts have recognized. The courts have 
fashioned a number of exceptions to this rule; however, appellants' case fits within none of these 
exceptions. The exceptions include motions made under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
60(b), 54(b), Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b), and Utah Code Annotated §30-3-5(3). 
Though U.R.A.P. 4(b) refers to "any other such motion", this phrase references motions that 
are the functional equivalent of the exceptions listed above. If a party's motion does not fall 
within the functional equivalent of one of these motions, then Notice of Appeal divests the trial 
court of jurisdiction, and the time for appeal is not tolled. 
"Plain error" is also the appropriate standard of review in this case because counsel for 
appellant passed the jury for cause during the voir dire of the jury. Counsel also declined to 
provide the trial court with any further questions for voir dire when the trial court requested him 
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to do so. Though appellants claim that they are entitled to an "abuse of discretion" standard of 
review if this court holds that the trial court was without jurisdiction to consider the Motion for 
Reconsideration, appellants have not raised any of the issues from their Motion for a New Trial 
in this appeal. Therefore, the correct standard of review, no matter what the jurisdictional 
posture this court decides is appropriate, is "plain error". 
Appellants' claims that pre-trial publicity biased the jury are unsubstantiated and 
insufficient to establish actual prejudice. This court would have to engage in speculation and 
numerous leaps of logic in order to reach the conclusion appellants pray for. 
The trial court appropriately exercised its discretion in conducting the voir dire of the 
jury panel. The questioning in the area of tort reform publicity is subject to a two-tier approach 
in which the court is precluded from asking further questions if the prospective jurors do not 
respond in the affirmative to the threshold question. In this case, the trial court asked the 
appropriate threshold question and received no affirmative responses. Under a "totality of the 
questioning" standard, the trial court also asked many other questions that allowed appellants to 
intelligently exercise their challenges to the jury panel. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. Appellants' Notice of Appeal divested the trial court of jurisdiction to consider 
Appellants' Motion for Reconsideration. 
A. Under the general rule, a Notice of Appeal divests the lower court of 
jurisdiction. 
Appellants claim this court and the court of appeals have issued conflicting opinions 
regarding the issue of jurisdiction after a Notice of Appeal has been filed. (Appellants' Brief 
p. 13, 15). Appellants make this claim, apparently on the basis of different results obtained in 
the cases of White v. State. 795 P.2d 648 (Utah 1990), Hurt v. Hurt. 793 P.2d 948 (Utah App. 
1990), Peay v. Peay. 607 P.2d 841 (Utah 1980), and Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son. 808 
P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991). Appellants claim that because the trial court was divested of jurisdiction 
in White and allowed to retain jurisdiction in Hurt, there is an irreconcilable conflict which the 
court must now resolve. (Appellants' Brief p. 13). Appellants claim the same conflict in 
comparing Peay and Watkiss as to when a Motion for Reconsideration will toll a time for 
appeal. (Appellants' Brief p. 15). In fact, under a more complete analysis, there is no conflict 
between these cases and they are all reconcilable. 
Appellants correctly state that the general rule has been that "an appeal divests the trial 
courts of jurisdiction and transfers jurisdiction to the appellate court where it remains until the 
appellate proceeding terminates and the trial court regains jurisdiction." White v. State, 795 
P.2d 648, 649 (Utah 1990). In the case at bar, appellants filed a Notice of Appeal after the trial 
court had denied their Motion for a New Trial and they had subsequently filed a Motion for 
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Reconsideration, but had not yet received a ruling on that latter motion. Under the language of 
the general rule, this Notice of Appeal divested the trial court of jurisdiction to rule on their 
Motion for Reconsideration. Therefore, any errors they claimed in that Motion for 
Reconsideration have not been appropriately addressed by the trial court and are heard for the 
first time by the appellate court. 
B. Appellants' Motion for Reconsideration does not fall within the recognized 
exceptions to the general rule that a Notice of Appeal divests the trial court 
of jurisdiction. 
As with most general rules, the courts have fashioned a number of exceptions to the 
general rule referred to above that a Notice of Appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction. The 
case law in Utah has developed exceptions in four major areas. These exceptions fall under 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 4(b), and Utah Code Annotated §30-3-5(3). All of the cases provided by appellant 
either come within one of these exceptions and the lower court retains jurisdiction, thus tolling 
the time for an appeal, or they fall outside of these delineated exceptions, the lower court is 
divested of jurisdiction, and the time for appeal is not tolled. Appellants' Motion for 
Reconsideration does not fall within any of the above exceptions and therefore, the lower court 
was divested of jurisdiction and the time within which appellant might appeal was not tolled. 
1. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) 
Both this court and the Utah Court of Appeals have considered this issue and ruled that 
the "trial court has jurisdiction to consider a 60(b) motion while an appeal is pending." Baker 
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v. Western Surety Company, 757 P.2d 878, 880 (Utah App. 1988). The Utah Court of Appeals 
recognized that this approach allows the trial court to better recognize a frivolous 60(b) motion 
and to evaluate the merits of the motion more quickly, thus avoiding unnecessary appeals. Id. 
The court outlined the procedure to be followed if the district court found the 60(b) motion to 
be without merit. The district court may enter an order denying the motion and the parties could 
appeal that order; however, if the trial court granted the motion then a brief memorandum to that 
effect to the appellate court would be appropriate to request an order of remand. Id. 
This court adopted The Utah Court of Appeal's reasoning in recognizing that exceptions 
to the general rule were necessary to prevent unnecessary delay, "where any action by the trial 
court is not likely to modify a party's rights with respect to the issues raised on appeal". White 
v. State, 795 P.2d 648, 650 (Utah 1990). 
2. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) 
This court also recognized in White v. State, supra, at 650, that "where the trial court 
has, pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 54(b) certified as final a judgment against one 
party in a multi-party action, the remainder of the action remains in the trial court as not 
necessarily affected by the appeal. In that case, the trial court has jurisdiction to proceed with 
the claims remaining unadjudicated." (Emphasis added). The court in that case refers to an 
earlier case, Lane v. Messer, 689 P.2d 1333, 1334 (1984), in which it explains the relationship 
of Rule 54(b) to the rights of appeal. 
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However, the entry of such a final judgment does not affect the 
ability of the district court to proceed with respect to the remainder 
of the claims and/or parties. Similarly when an appeal is taken 
from such a judgment, it only brings before this court that portion 
of the action with respect to which the judgment has been entered; 
the rest of the action remains in the trial court and is not 
necessarily affected by the appeal. 
The court noted in that case that this was a sensible rule, or otherwise, where numerous 
claims or parties were joined it would "automatically stop all proceedings until the appeal had 
run its course. The potential for unnecessary delay is obvious." Id. 
This court also interpreted a Motion to Reconsider a summary judgment to be viable 
under Rule 54(b). In that case, the court relied on Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors. 
761 P.2d 42 (Utah App. 1988), "in looking beyond the procedural question to the merits, i.e, 
the potential for a different outcome if the motion to reconsider were granted." Timm v. 
Dewsnup. 851 P.2d 1178, 1185 (Utah 1993). The court also recognized that it had previously 
held that Rule 54(b) permits reconsideration of a non-final judgment "since it facilitates the just 
and speedy resolution of disputes in the trial court." Id. (citing Kennedy v. New Era Indus.. 
Inc.. 600 P.2d 534, 536 (Utah 1979). 
3. Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b) 
Appellants correctly recognize the significance of Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b) 
and the interpretation of "any other such motion." However, this phrase does not create the 
dilemma appellants claim. (Appellants' Brief p. 15-16). In the case of Watkiss & Campbell v. 
Foa & Son. 808 P.2d 1061, 1064 (1991), this court recognized that Foa's pleading entitled 
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"Exception to Order and Motion for Reconsideration of Summary Judgment" was treated by the 
lower court as a motion for a new trial, and on that basis the court felt that it tolled the time 
period to file on appeal. The basis for this determination was "any other such motion" in Utah 
Rule of Appellate Civil Procedure 4(b). Id. at 1063. This court further recognized that there 
is no motion to reconsider a trial court's order of judgment, because of the concerns expressed 
in Drury v. Lunceford, 18 Utah 2d 74, 415 P.2d 662 (1966), particularly a need for finality of 
judgments and orders. Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d at 1064. Nevertheless, 
because Foa's motion was in essence, a motion for a new trial the court recognized that it was 
"like" the motions in Rule 4(b) of Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The court also 
recognized that "[tjreating the motion to reconsider as a motion for a new trial eliminates the 
fears expressed in Drury". Id. at 1065 n. 11. Because the effect of the motion was essentially 
the same as an appropriate motion, i.e., under Rule 59, the court allowed it. Likewise, in 
Darrington v. Wade, 812 P.2d 452, 457 (Utah App. 1991), because the party's objection to the 
judgment was the "functional equivalent" to a Rule 60(b) motion, the court used Rule 60(b) to 
vacate its judgment. When the substance of a mislabeled motion is in essence the same as an 
appropriate motion, courts can use the rule to grant relief. Kunzler v. O'Dell, 855 P.2d 270, 
274 (Utah App. 1993). 
In this case, appellants filed a Motion for Reconsideration in the trial court and the trial 
court interpreted that motion as the "functional equivalent" of an amended motion for a new 
trial. The trial court ruling, in the case at bar, analyzed that motion under a Rule 59 analysis, 
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as well as a Rule 60(b) analysis. (R. 534-38). (Exhibit L). Both of these rules have been held 
as exceptions to the general rule that a notice of appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction. 
However, appellants reject the trial court's characterization of their motion as either an amended 
motion for a new trial or a Rule 60(b) motion. (Appellants' Brief p. 28). Appellants seek an 
abuse of discretion standard of review, which would be appropriate if they were appealing from 
their Motion for a New Trial. See Moonlake Electric Association, Inc. v. Ultrasystems Western 
Constructors. Inc., (Utah App. 1988) (trial courts ruling on a motion for a new trial will be 
disturbed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion). However, though appellants filed a Notice 
of Appeal after the trial court denied their initial Motion for a New Trial, appellants do not 
address any issues from their Motion for a New Trial in their brief. They also refuse to 
characterize their Motion for Reconsideration as a Motion for a New Trial. 
Appellants claim that the trial court incorrectly applied a "newly discovered evidence 
standard" because of its Rule 59 New Trial motion and Rule 60(b) analysis. (Appellants' Brief 
p. 28-29). However, the court in its ruling, recognized the concern for finality of decisions and 
only proceeded to consider Appellants1 Motion for Reconsideration because they had filed their 
original Motion for a New Trial pro se. (R. 534). (Exhibit L). It was on that basis that the 
trial judge gave some deference to appellants and treated their motion as an amended motion for 
a new trial though he included a 60(b) analysis as well, out of an abundance of caution. (R. 
535). (Exhibit L). Had the court not characterized the motion for reconsideration in this 
fashion, it would have had no jurisdiction to entertain the motion. 
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Even as an amended motion for a new trial, the court's jurisdiction is tenuous at best. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has held that an "order denying the party's initial motion for a new 
trial was the final appealable order of the trial court. That order fully and finally disposed of 
the claims and assertions of the [other party] and the trial court was 'without power to alter its 
prior ruling upon the subsequent filing of what is in essence the same motion,,\ State v. 
McMullen. 764 P.2d 634, 635 (Utah App. 1988) (citing Tracy v. The University of Utah 
Hospital, 619 P.2d 340, 342 (1980). This is the reasoning behind the ruling in Drury v. 
Lunceford, 18 Utah 2d 74, 415 P.2d 662 (1966), reiterated in Peay v. Peay. 607 P.2d 841, 843 
(Utah 1980), where the court noted that a Motion for Reconsideration was an attempt to 
"persuade the judge to reverse himself . . . and he should not be in the position of having the 
further duty of acting as a court of review upon his own ruling." 
In this case, appellants filed a Motion for a New Trial and it was denied. (R. 457). 
Such denial was a final appealable order of the trial court and the trial court was without power 
to alter that ruling. Appellants then filed a Motion for Reconsideration but refuse to characterize 
it as the "functional equivalent" of any motion which would appropriately toll the time for 
appeal. 
4. Utah Code Annotated 30-3-5(3). Continuing jurisdiction for support and 
maintenance of the parties 
Appellants claim that there is a conflict between the cases of White v. State, supra, and 
Hurt v. Hurt, supra, because this court in White states the general rule that the trial court is 
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divested of jurisdiction after a Notice of Appeal and the appeals court in Hurt declares that the 
trial court retains jurisdiction to take necessary action, even when an appeal is pending. 
(Appellants' Brief p. 13). However, appellants ignore the fact that in White v. State itself the 
court recognized that district courts have continuing jurisdiction after entry of a final divorce 
decree to adjudicate petitions to modify "since the petition for modification is collateral to the 
divorce decree". White v. State, supra, at 650. The decision in Hurt v. Hurt was based upon 
a petition to modify child support obligations of the defendant. The appellate court noted 
correctly that the trial court was "clearly not without jurisdiction to enter that judgment" because 
it retains jurisdiction to take "necessary action" even when "an appeal is pending". Hurt v. 
Hurt, supra, at 951. The court also noted that this is the case, even if the trial court action 
might moot the appeal. Id. (citing Cingolani v. Utah Power & Light. 790 P.2d 129 (Utah App. 
1990)). 
The distinction between what causes of action require an appeal and those which retain 
continuing jurisdiction in the district court in divorce cases is made clear in the case of Peters 
v. Peters. 15 Utah 2d 413, 394 P.2d 71 (1964). This court noted that "the main judgment is 
a final and appealable judgment as to the issues therein dealt with." However, there is, 
another aspect of a divorce proceeding which is entirely different. 
After the main judgment is entered life goes on and the needs of 
the spouses and children and the duties to fulfill them continue day 
after day. In order to take care of these needs it is essential that 
the trial court have continuing jurisdiction to enforce the rights of 
the parties. Id. at 417. 
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Further the court noted that: 
There is no good reason why not and every good reason why that 
court should and does have continuing jurisdiction in the action 
over the family's continuing problems to protect the rights and 
interests of the parties. That this is true and was so recognized by 
the legislature is indicated in Section 30-3-5, U.C.A., 1953. Id. 
The court also recognized that "subsequent changes or new orders which must be based 
on changed circumstances obviously could only be made by the court in supplemental 
proceedings" where fact finding could be accomplished. Id. 
The trial court retains jurisdiction to take necessary action in a case when an appeal is 
pending when that necessary action is related to modification of child support or spouse 
maintenance or custody as defined in Utah Code Ann. 30-3-5. That rule is not contrary to the 
general rule but a clearly defined exception under which appellants' case clearly does not apply. 
C. A Motion for Reconsideration does not toll the time for appeal unless it is the 
functional equivalent of an appropriate motion. 
The Utah Courts have long followed, as well as recently recognized, the fact that there 
is no motion to reconsider under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Kunzler v. O'DelL supra, 
at 274, (Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide for any such motion); Utah State 
Employees Credit Unions v. Riding. 24 Utah 2d 211, 469 P.2d 1 (1970) (we think the motion 
to vacate the judgment is abortive under the rules). The reasoning behind this position is based 
on the case of Drury v. Lunceford, supra, mentioned above, in which this court noted if a 
Motion for Reconsideration were allowed "why should not the other party who is now ruled 
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against be permitted to make a Motion for Reconsideration". The court in Drury further noted 
that the rules of procedure were designed to provide a pattern of regularity which the courts and 
parties could rely on. It also noted that "practical expediency demands that there be some 
finality to the actions of the court." Id. See also, Maverick Country Stores, Inc. v. Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 860 P.2d 944, 950 (Utah App. 1993) (creating another layer of appeal 
would allow mischievous counsel to use the right to reconsideration as a tool for needless and 
in some cases harmful delay); Ring v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 744 P.2d 602, 604 (Utah 
App. 1987) (petitioner is entitled to "one bite of the apple" on review . . . that opportunity 
cannot be expanded into a multi-course buffet by such devices as reconsideration). Should 
motions for reconsideration be allowed, this court recognized that "tenacious litigants and 
lawyers might persist in motions, arguments and pressures and theoretically [this might go on] 
ad infinitum." Maverick Country Stores. Inc., 860 P.2d at 952 (quoting Watkiss & Campbell 
v. Foa & Son, supra, at 1064, (alteration in original). 
In Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors. 761 P.2d 42, 44 (1988), this court 
recognized that though a motion to reconsider was not expressly available under the rules, Rule 
54(b) did allow for the possibility of a judge changing his or her mind in cases involving 
multiple parties or multiple claims. However, in that case they denied the motion based on the 
"law of the case" doctrine because no new legal theories or new material evidence was 
introduced. In this case, this trial court's memorandum decision on the Motion for 
Reconsideration addresses the issue of new legal theories or material evidence under the Rule 
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59 analysis and concludes that appellants' "new evidence" with regard to the pre-trial publicity 
was insufficient to alter the verdict. (R. 435-37). (Exhibit L). 
Appellants correctly note that this court in Peay v. Peay, supra, at 843, held that a "party 
cannot extend the time for filing an appeal simply by filing a 'Motion for Reconsideration'". 
However, appellants neglected to analyze the context in which that holding was made. In the 
Peay case, the defendant originally filed a motion to modify the divorce decree pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §30-3-5. Alternatively they asked that the decree be vacated and set aside. The 
lower court granted his modification and struck the motion to vacate and set aside. Id. at 842. 
The defendant filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the order striking the petition and motion 
for relief of final judgment. This court recognized that the defendant's request for relief was 
fully satisfied when his Motion for Modification was granted and his alternative claim became 
moot. However, it analyzed the motion to reconsider and held that they were without 
jurisdiction to rule upon the merits, but only because he had filed his Notice of Appeal untimely. 
Id. at 843. The striking of the motion to vacate does not fall within the exceptions to the 
general rule that appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction. Therefore, the time for appeal was 
not tolled and the court correctly noted that a "party cannot extend the time for filing an appeal 
simply by filing a motion for reconsideration". Id. Likewise in Tracy v. University of Utah 
Hospital, 619 P.2d 340 (1980) the court identified petitioner's motion to reconsider as, in 
essence, a second motion to intervene and held that the Rules of Civil Procedure "make no 
provision for such a motion as that of 'reconsideration'". Id. at 342. A motion for intervention 
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does not fall within on^ of the recognized exceptions to the general rule that a notice of appeal 
divests the trial court of jurisdiction. 
If a motion is not identifiable under the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court will look to 
its "functional equivalent" and when the substance of the mislabeled motion is, in essence, the 
same as an appropriate motion, the courts can use the rule to grant relief. Kunzler v. O'Delh 
supra, at 274. The title of a motion is not dispositive. In the Kunzler case, the court held the 
appellees' motion to clarify the trial court's original order was the "functional equivalent" of the 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion. On that basis, the court allowed a motion to be 
heard and ruled upon under Rule 60(b) analysis. Id. at 273. 
In this case, appellants have filed a Motion for Reconsideration based upon the claim of 
plain error and the authority of courts to enact justice. There is no such motion recognized 
under the rules and therefore, such a motion does not toll the time for appeal. The only 
exception to this would be if appellants' motion was the functional equivalent of an appropriate 
rule identifiable under the Rules of Civil Procedure which would toll the time for appeal. 
Appellants' Motion for Reconsideration does not come within any of the recognized exceptions 
to the general rule that a Notice of Appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction. Appellants have 
created a new motion which is unrecognizable and inappropriate in the trial court. The 
appropriate forum for a claim of "plain error" is the appellate court. Therefore, appellants' first 
appeal was timely and appropriate as the trial court had no jurisdiction to hear Appellants' 
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Motion for Reconsideration. The second appeal was unnecessary, as the time was not tolled 
when appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration. 
EL The voir dire of prospective jurors was sufficient to allow counsel to intelligently 
evaluate the jurors. 
A. The standard of review when counsel passes the jury for cause is "plain 
error". 
Appellants maintain that if the trial court retained jurisdiction to enter their order denying 
Appellants' Motion for Reconsideration, they are subject to an abuse of discretion standard of 
review. (Appellants' Brief p. 2). Appellee has already argued that the trial court was divested 
of jurisdiction after the appellants filed their Notice of Appeal; however, even if the court should 
hold that the trial court was not divested of jurisdiction, the standard of review in this case 
would remain "plain error". As mentioned above in the section on Issues and Standard of 
Review, supra, p. 2, appellants have not appealed the trial court's denial of a new trial. They 
have not addressed any of the issues in their Motion for a New Trial and are not entitled to an 
abuse of discretion standard on that basis. 
Even if the above was not true, appellants are still subject to a plain error standard of 
review since their counsel passed the jury for cause. (R. 617). State v. Brooks. 868 P.2d 818, 
821 (Utah App. 1994). The Utah Appellate Court has noted that if counsel had 
challenged the jurors for cause our standard of review . . . would 
be an abuse of discretion. The more stringent standard of plain 
error is appropriate when there was no challenge by counsel, 
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because of our inability, on appeal, to view the jurors and assess 
their potential bias. Only those present, the court and counsel, 
have that advantaged view. That notion also buttresses our view 
that defense counsel reasonably exercised professional judgment as 
to trial strategy in each of these instances and consciously did not 
challenge for cause. State v. Ellifritz. 835 P.2d 170, 177 (Utah 
App. 1992). 
In this case, appellants not only passed the jury for cause, they informed the judge upon 
his request, that the court had not forgotten to ask any questions. 
THE COURT: Any-anything that I've skipped over, gentlemen? 
MR. BLACK, SR.: I can't think of anything that your Honor has 
missed. 
THE COURT: Okay, thank you Mr. Black. Mr. Jeffs? 
MR. JEFFS: No. (R. 611-12). (Exhibit J). 
Appellants cannot even claim that the court would have been unwilling to answer further 
questions at appellants' request. Earlier in the voir dire proceeding the court asked defense 
counsel if there were any questions he wished the court to make and counsel for the defense 
made a request which the court promptly complied with. 
THE COURT: I--I think that, Mr. Jeffs, that Fve-fairly well 
handled the remainder of your requested requests and unless you 
have some specific inquiry that you wish for me to make. 
MR. JEFFS: You may be going to ask this question already. I 
wanted to know if any of them, a close member of their family, 
immediate family or close acquaintance has had a--the birth of a 
premature child or premature birth and whether that would affect 
their ability to be fair and impartial. 
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THE COURT: Have—any of the potential jurors had an 
experience or had a close acquaintance have a experience with a 
premature birth? Let me ask it that way. Let's start up here. (R. 
605, 606). (Exhibit M). 
It is inconceivable that a party who has failed to remind the judge of unanswered 
questions when asked, and additionally passed a jury for cause, could claim any error in the voir 
dire process. The court asked counsel for additional questions, and counsel neglected to 
respond. Additionally, appellants' counsel clearly passed the jury for cause. 
Under a plain error standard, "an error requires reversal when it is 'plain' i.e., obvious 
to the trial court and also harmful, i.e., affects the substantial rights of the accused." Ong Intern 
(U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Avenue Corporation, 850 P.2d 447, 459 (1993). The court need not 
reverse unless it determines an error existed that was both obvious and harmful. State v. Olsen, 
869 P.2d 1004, 1010 (Utah App. 1994). Appellants cannot rely on an alleged objection raised 
in a bench conference that was not preserved on the record. Id. 
B, Appellant presents no evidence that pre-trial publicity prejudiced the jury. 
Appellants claim that the pre-trial publicity regarding appellee, Allen Memorial Hospital, 
prejudiced the jury to the extent that there could have been a more favorable outcome otherwise. 
However, it is unclear whether the more favorable outcome would have occurred absent the 
publicity, if the trial court had been moved to another venue, or if appellants' counsel had been 
allowed to ask additional questions on the voir dire (even though counsel had that opportunity 
and declined). (R. 611). 
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Appellants spend pages of their brief detailing the pre-trial publicity over a one year 
penod to which the prospective jurors could have been exposed. (Appellants' Brief p. 21-24). 
The Utah Court of Appeals has held that evidence of the pervasiveness of pre-trial publicity is 
not enough to answer the question of whether the jury was fair and impartial. State v. Caver, 
814 P.2d 604, 609 (Utah App. 1991). "The fact that some jurors had knowledge of the case 
from media accounts is not sufficient by itself to establish prejudice." Id. at 610. A party must 
show that they are "actually prejudiced". State v. Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004, 1008 (Utah App. 
1994). These cases also indicate that the remedy for pervasive pre-trial publicity would be a 
request for a change of venue, which never occurred in this case. 
In Appellants' Brief and the earlier Motion for Reconsideration, appellants indicated with 
great specificity the claimed pervasiveness of pre-trial publicity regarding appellee, Allen 
Memorial Hospital. (Appellants' Brief p. 21-24 and Appellants' Addendum Exhibit A). This 
publicity was not related to the appellants' case with appellee, Allen Memorial Hospital, but only 
concerned the financial condition of the hospital in general. Appellants claim that because the 
trial court concluded that "the information was available" and could have been known to the 
appellants with reasonable diligence, this inescapably leads to the conclusion that the court and 
jury were aware of the publicity and such awareness constituted plain error. (Appellants' Brief 
p. 28 n.6). Unlike appellants, the court and jurors are not under any obligation of reasonable 
diligence to produce or acknowledge the pre-trial publicity. Even if the publicity was arguably 
obvious, that is no indication that the existence of the publicity created obvious error. Whether 
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or not the publicity could have been known to the trial court or the jury it is not dispositive of 
plain error, as claimed in Appellants' Brief. 
Appellant also claims that the trial court's refusal to allow certain questions during voir 
dire precluded them from determining the impact of any publicity on the prospective jurors. 
(Appellants' Brief p. 30-31). However, the trial court specifically addressed this issue when it 
asked the prospective jurors, "Have any of you acquired any information about the plaintiffs or 
the defendants which would—bias you either for or against Mr. and Mrs. Davis, the Allen 
Memorial Hospital or Dr. Murray? If anyone has acquired any information would they raise 
their hand? I see that no hands are raised." (R. 600). (Exhibit G). 
Appellants are unable to demonstrate that the pre-trial publicity regarding appellee Allen 
Memorial Hospital prejudiced the jury. There is no obvious error since no juror even 
acknowledge it had acquired any information regarding any of the parties which they believed 
would give them cause for bias. Appellants also produced no evidence that the alleged error was 
harmful, i.e., that there was a substantial likelihood the outcome would have been different. 
State v. Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004, 1011 (Utah App. 1994). In fact, the trial court, in its ruling 
recognized this failing when it held, 
Their attempt to connect the publicity blitz to their claim of 
prejudice fails because any number of possible alternatives to their 
explanation of the verdict is equally as likely an explanation and 
the most likely is that the jurors concluded that the doctor and the 
hospital had done all things possible under the circumstances. 
(Emphasis added). (R. 536-37). (Exhibit L). 
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The case that appellants cite for support of their argument refer to tort reform publicity. 
(Appellants' Brief p. 26-33). If appellants are basing their argument of error on the fact that 
this publicity prejudiced the jury by raising concerns of so-called "tort reform", their argument 
is equally thin. In fact, of all of the articles submitted by appellants only one makes any 
reference to rising costs due to malpractice lawsuits. (R. 497). (Exhibit K). As noted in the 
statement of facts above, that article refers to senior citizens at a luncheon who voice concern 
over several issues including malpractice suits, local insurance, high staff to patient ratios, low 
hospital occupancy, lack of information and even the need for a hospital. Appellants' statement 
in their brief that "at those meetings attendees express concern that costs of medical care are 
increasing due to malpractice suits" is an overstatement. (Appellants' Brief p. 22). In fact, only 
this one article refers to any such concerns. 
Appellants also claim that the "Grand County citizens were barraged with threats the 
hospital would close if the tax increased failed". (Appellants' Brief p. 22). Whether or not the 
Grand County citizens were "barraged" with such threats, the fact is that they voted down the 
requested tax increase. (R. 536). Therefore, it is pure speculation to now conclude that the jury 
voted no cause of action against the hospital because the hospital might close. Appellants base 
their argument of prejudice on an article included in their brief on page 23. However, nothing 
in this article refers to the costs of malpractice suits as being any source of the hospital's 
problems. This article does describe the hospital's search for two doctors to set up a practice 
in 1994 and questions if the hospital has been run responsibly. Appellants have isolated one 
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issue, fear of possible closure of the hospital, and claim it is the likely reason the jurors 
rendered a verdict of no cause against appellee hospital. To reach that conclusion, this court 
would have to leap through several steps in logic. It must assume, first, that the jurors read the 
articles in question and remembered them; second, that the jurors cared or were concerned that 
the hospital would close; third, that the closure of the hospital would affect them in a meaningful 
way; and finally, if all of the above were true, that belief would affect their verdict in this case, 
i.e., that they believed rendering a verdict against the hospital would, in fact, close the hospital. 
Even if the court were inclined to make these leaps of logic, the trial court's voir dire precludes 
getting past the first step, since it asked the prospective jurors if they had acquired any 
information about the parties which would bias them. (R. 600). (Exhibit G). In any event, 
such mental gymnastics hardly meets the standard of "obviousness" required for plain error. 
C. The trial court appropriately exercised its discretion in the voir dire of 
prospective jurors. 
Though appellee believes "plain error" is the appropriate standard of review in this case, 
it recognizes this court may consider the issues raised under an abuse of discretion standard. 
However, even under such a standard, the trial court properly exercised its discretion in 
conducting the voir dire of the jury panel. The cases that appellant relies on refer only to tort 
reform publicity and appellee has already pointed out the lack of that type of information in the 
publicity appellants have submitted. Therefore, it is questionable whether such analysis is even 
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applicable to this case. However, for purposes of refuting appellants1 claims, appellee provides 
the following argument. 
"This court will overturn the trial court's discretionary rejection of voir dire questions 
only upon a showing that the 'abuse of discretion rose to the level of reversible error'". State 
v. Hall. 797 P.2d 470, 472 (Utah App.) {cert, denied 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990)) (cited in 
Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 96,98 (Utah App. 1993)). "A trial court commits reversible error 
when 'considering the totality of the questioning, counsel [is not] afforded an adequate 
opportunity to gain the information necessary to evaluate jurors'". Barrett v. Peterson, 858 P.2d 
at 98. (alteration in original). 
The court makes clear in both Barrett v. Peterson, supra, and Evans v. Doty, 824 P.2d 
460 (Utah App. 1992), the voir dire questioning in this area is subject to a two-tier approach. 
This approach is designed to "balance the conflicting interests of selecting an impartial jury and 
the prejudice infused into the proceedings by the questioning about exposure to tort reform 
information". Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d at 99. 
In the Barrett case, the plaintiff was concerned about specific articles which had appeared 
in national magazines to which the jurors may have been exposed. Id- Likewise, in this case 
appellants claim concern regarding the prospective jurors' possible exposure to numerous 
specific articles in the local newspaper. The court in Barrett explained that plaintiff must first 
demonstrate the potential jurors are likely to have been exposed to such material by 
demonstrating the subject articles were recently published in widely read media. Assuming 
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appellants had, arguably, demonstrated this (though no evidence of circulation, etc. was 
presented), after that initial showing, the party is entitled to ask either of the following first-tier 
questions: 
(1) Whether the prospective juror has heard of or read anything 
(not necessarily related to insurance) which might affect his ability 
to sit as an impartial juror . . .; or (2) Whether the prospective 
juror regularly reads any of the magazines or newspapers in which 
it has been demonstrated that the insurance advertisements and 
articles had appeared . . . if any juror answers these inquiries 
affirmatively the plaintiff is entitled to proceed to more specific 
second-tier questions concerning tort reform." Id;. See also. 
Evans v. Doty. 824 P.2d at 466. 
In this case, the trial court clearly complied with this direction by asking the prospective 
jurors whether they had acquired any information about any of the parties involved in this suit 
and if this information would bias them for or against any of the parties. (R. 600, Exhibit G). 
The court, in Barrett, noted that, depending on the response to these inquiries further questions 
can be pursued, subject to the trial court's discretion. Barrett v. Peterson, supra, at 100. 
In Barrett, the appellate court noted that "none of the questions asked by the trial court 
even remotely addressed whether the prospective jurors had heard or read anything related to 
tort reform issues. Nor did the trial court attempt to address in a more general fashion the 
issues of medical negligence and tort reform propaganda in its voir dire questioning". Id. at 
102. In this case, not only did the trial court ask the question described above but it also asked 
questions regarding medical negligence, and jurors' concern for lawsuits in general and suits 
against their doctor or hospital, in particular. (R. 609, 610) (Exhibit G, Exhibit H). 
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Even if this court determines that the trial court should have allowed additional 
questioning during voir dire, the failure to ask an appropriate question "does not always 
constitute an abuse of discretion requiring reversal. We only reverse if 'considering the totality 
of the questioning counsel [is not] afforded an adequate opportunity to gain the information 
necessary to evaluate jurors'". Evans v. Doty, supra, at 468 (quoting State v. Bishop. 753 P.2d 
439, 448 (Utah 1988)). In the Evans case, the appellate court noted that under this "totality of 
the questioning" standard, the trial court had asked many questions that would have allowed 
plaintiff "to intelligently exercise her peremptory challenges, including an inquiry into the jurors' 
occupations, background and feelings about medical malpractice in general." Id. The court 
further noted that the trial court had excused two potential jurors because of their claim that they 
could not be impartial. Id. 
In this case as well, the trial court asked many questions inquiring into the jurors' 
occupations, backgrounds and feelings about medical malpractice in general (Exhibit H). The 
trial court also excused a number of jurors whose answers indicated they may have trouble being 
impartial. (R. 398, 574, 577, 584, 587, 593) (Exhibit E, Exhibit I). Therefore, under the 
totality of the questioning, the trial court did not commit reversible error nor abuse its discretion 
in conducting its voir dire of this case. 
Appellants also claim that the trial court abused its discretion when it concluded appellees 
had failed to show any connection between attitudes the jury may have had and their finding of 
no cause of action against appellee, Allen Memorial Hospital. (R. 535-36). Appellants conclude 
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that the language in the memorandum decision "assumes the jury's failure to reach the issue of 
damages shows the jury was not prejudice by the hospitals pre-trial publicity blitz". (Appellants' 
Brief p. 29). Appellants cite to Evans v. Doty, for support of this argument. 
First, the trial court's memorandum does not conclude that the jury's failure to award 
damages indicates no connection between any prejudice the jury may have had and the pre-trial 
publicity. What the ruling states is that plaintiffs fail to show any connection between the 
publicity and any verdict the jury may have reached. 
Second, in the Evans case, the court rejected the analysis in the Montana case of 
Borkoski v. Yost, 182 Mont. 28, 594 P.2d 688 (1979), in which that court held "a biased jury 
would manifest their bias by first finding liability and then improperly limiting the damage 
award", because the facts of Yost were distinguishable from those in Evans v. Doty, 824 P.2d 
at 468. In Yost the parties were dealing with a "very specific and unique situation-the direct 
impact of an identifiable and contemporaneous nationwide advertising campaign on potential 
jurors". Id. In Evans, the plaintiff was more concerned about jurors' general feelings about tort 
reform and therefore, the appellate court refused to accept the Yost analysis. In this case, 
appellants' claim is based upon a claimed specific identifiable campaign directed at the potential 
jurors. Therefore, the analysis in Evans case in not controlling in this matter. The trial court 
asked the threshold questions recommended for inquiries concerning specific tort reform 




"The constitution presupposes that a jury selected from a fair cross-section of the 
community is impartial, regardless of the mix of individual viewpoints actually represented on 
the jury, so long as the jurors can conscientiously and properly carry out their sworn duty to 
apply the facts of the particular case." State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 390 (Utah 1993) 
Beginning from the premise that the jurors are presumed impartial, the function of the 
voir dire is to expose any bias or prejudice for counsel so that they may exercise their challenges 
for cause and peremptory challenges. Barrett v. Peterson, supra, at 98 In this case, under 
either a "plain error" or "abuse of discretion standard", the tnal court clearly conducted the voir 
dire in an appropriate manner. Appellees respectfully request this court to affirm the decision 
of the court below. 
Respectfully submitted this / / day of September, 1994. 
M. Dayle Jeff/" / 
Attorney for Appellee 
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ADDENDUM TO APPELLEE'S BRIEF 
EXHIBIT A 
1 during this little break. 
2 MR. JEFFS: And the Court hasn't called for it, but 
3 I assume that before that:- recess, the Court ought to call for 
4 whether there are any--whether the jury is passed for cause. 
5 THE COURT: Oh. Thank you. And I will. 
6 Mr.--do you pass the jury for cause at this time, 
7 Mr.--
8 MR. BLACK, JR.: We do, your Honor. 
9 MR. JEFFS: We pass the jury for cause, your Honor. 
10 THE COURT: Thank you. 
11 I don't even have to give them an instruction, do I? 
12 Not this time. Next time you get an instruction, but go ahead 
13 and take a stretch break and we'll come back and I'll--oh, 
14 let's see, gee. I didn't see what time it is. We're not 
15 going to--we're not only going to take a stretch break, we're 
16 going to take a lunch break; it's a quarter past 12:00 
17 already, so we'll excuse the jury to--to go and have lunch, 
18 return here--will 1:30 give you sufficient time to--to have 
19 lunch and get back here and kind of check in on your family 
20 and tell your boss that you might be gone for five days 
instead of one? 
So, we'll stand in recess and return here at 1:30, 
23 I proceed at that time. 
24 (Recess.) 
25 THE COURT: Please be seated. 
21 
22 
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EXHIBIT B 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
Grand County 
F,LED
 DEC - 2 1993 
BY. 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
Deputy 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF GRAND COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT DAVIS AND MICHELE DAVIS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ROBERT O. MURRAY, M.D. and GRAND 




Civii No. 9107-26 
Judge Bruce K. IJalliday 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
Please answer the. following questions from a preponderance of the evidence. If you find 
the evidence preponderates in favor of the issue presented, answer "Yes." If you find the 
evidence is so equally balanced that you cannot determine a preponderance of the evidence, or 
if you find that the evidence preponderates against the issue presented, answer ' 'No." Also, any 
damages assessed must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. 
1. Considering all the evidence in this case, was the defendant, Dr. Robert 0. 
Murray, M.D., negligent? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
2. If youi answer to Question 1 is "Yes," was such negligence a proximate cause 
of the death of the child? 
ANSWER: Yes No X 
3. Considering all the evidence in this case, was the defendant, Allen Memorial 
Hospital, negligent? 
ANSWER: Yes No X 
4. If your answer to Question 3 is "Yes," was such negligence a proximate cause 
of the death nf the child? 
ANSWER: Yes No Y 
NOTE: if you answered Questions 1, 2, 3 and 4 "No ," you need not go further 
in answering additional questions. Please sign the verdict form and notify the Coun. If you have 
answered Questions 1, 2, 3 or 4 "Yes," please proceed to the next question. 
5. If you bave answered either of Questions 2 or 4 "Yes," then, and only then, 
answer the following question: 
Assuming the combined negligence of all parties to total 100%, what percentage 
of that negligence is attributable to: 
A. Defendant, Dr. Robert 0 . Murray % 
B. Defendant, Allen Memorial Hospital % 
TOTAL 100% 
6. If you have answered either or both Questions 2 or 4 uYes," state the amount 
of special and general damages, if any, sustained by the plaintiffs as a proximate result or uie 
injuries complained of. If" such questions were not answered *l Yes,'' do not answer this question. 
Special Damages: 
Special Damages $1,298.89 
General Damages: $ 
TOTAL $ 
DATED Uiis J day of h^ct\yihcr , 19jT3_. 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT AND MICHELE DAVIS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs 
ROBERT 0- MURRAY, M.D. 
ALLEN MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, 
Defendants. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Case No. 9207-26 
DATE: 11/29/93 
JUDGE BRUCE K. HALLIDAY 
Tapes: 93-258.1 thru 
93-258.12 
Clerk Vickie Riley 
JURY TRIAL 
PRESENT: Plaintiffs Robert and Michelle Davis 
Kay Osteen 
Plaintiffs' Attys John Black, Sr. and John Black, Jr. 
Defendant's Atty M. Dayle Jeffs 
This is the day and hour set for the above entitled 
case. Commencing at 9:30 a.m. all parties were present and ready 
to proceed. 
Out of the presence of the prospective jurors, Mr. 
Jeffs objected to voir dire questions numbered 11, 12, 17, 20, 
21, 25 and 28. Court disallowed numbers 17, 20, 25 & 28. The 
summoned jurors were escorted back into the courtroom. The clerk 
administered the qualification oath en masse. Fifteen jurors 
were then called to the jury box. Five jurors were challenged 
and excused for cause, to wit: Ronald Dolphin, Adam Newell, 
August Brooks, Anna Marie Englebright and Lena Stocks. Both 
sides passed for cause. Each attorney took 3 peremptory 
challenges (total of 6). 
The following are jurors to serve on this case: one is 
selected as an alternate. Juror to be announced at end of trial, 
before deliberation. Parties stipulated that it would be the 9th 
juror called. 
JOHN L. BLACK, SR., #0 3 48 
JOHN L. BLACK, JR., #0349 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
10 West 300 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 363-3550 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
Grand County 
F,LE0
 NOV 2 2 1993 
BY 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
Deputy 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




GRAND COUNTY SERVICE AREA, dba 
ALLEN MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, 
Defendant. 
PROPOSED VOIR DIRE 
QUESTIONS 
Case No. 9207-26 
Judge Bruce K. Halliday 
Plaintiffs hereby request the Court ask the following voir 
dire questions, along with appropriate follow-up questions, of the 
jury panel in addition to the questions which the Court normally 
asks: 
1. Are you, or anyone close to you, related to a doctor, 
dentist, nurse, or connected with a hospital? 
2. Do you know any of the parties or their attorneys in 
this case? 
3. Are you acquainted with any of the following people: 
Kay Osteen, Dr. Tom Harris, Dr. Robert Murray, Georgia Russell? 
A. Have you any children in your household? If so, how 
many and what are their ages? 
5. Have you, or anyone close to you, ever had a baby that 
was born prematurely? If so, did the baby live or die? 
6. Have you or anyone close to you ever been sued? 
7. Have you or anyone close to you sued someone else? 
8. Have you or anyone close to you been a witness in a 
legal proceeding? 
9. Have you or anyone close to you ever served on a jury? 
10. Have you or anyone close to you ever worked in a 
medical office or hospital? If so, please explain. 
11. Do you have any feelings about a patient suing his or 
her doctor or a hospital? 
12. Do you have any feelings about medical malpractice 
cases in general? 
13. What magazines do you or members of your household 
subscribe to? 
14. What is your profession? 
15. What is your spouse's profession? 
16. Is there anything you have read, heard, or experienced 
about medical malpractice cases which would cause you to doubt that 
you could be fair to all parties? 
17. Do you believe that a verdict against Allen Memorial 
Hospital in this case could affect you? 
18. Do you have any doubts at all that you can be fair to 
all the parties in this case? 
19. Do you have any prejudices for or against any person 
bringing a malpractice case? 
2 
20. Do you own any stocks or bonds, or have you ever been 
employed by any casualty company that insures against actions for 
injury and death? 
21. The term "malpractice11 is used in this case, but you 
will be told by the Court that it means negligence on the part of 
persons or hospitals and not intentional harm. Are you willing to 
follow such legal instructions? 
22. Do you understand that this is a civil, not a 
criminal, case and that it involves a claim for money damages and 
not a criminal penalty or punishment? Are you willing to consider 
the case in that light? 
23. Have you heard anything about this case prior to 
today? If so, has this given you any possible prejudices or 
feelings that may affect your judgment? 
24. After the evidence has been presented, the Judge will 
instruct you on the law involved in this case. Are you willing to 
be bound by the Court's instructions even if you have doubts about 
them? 
25. If you find that the Davis's are entitled to recover 
a verdict, and you also find that their damages are substantial, 
would you have any hesitation in bringing in a substantial verdict 
for the Davis's? 
26. Do you or someone close to you have a background in 
law or legally related matters? If so, explain. 
27. Do you or has someone close to you ever worked for a 
law firm? If so, explain. 
3 
28. Do you or does someone close to you have a background 
in reviewing or analyzing claims for personal injuries? 
DATED this £*& day of August, 1993. 
JOHN/L. BLACK, SR. 
J6HWL. BLACK, JR. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
RECEIVED A COPY OF THE FOREGOING PLAINTIFFS7 PROPOSED VOIR DIRE 
QUESTIONS THIS DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 1993. 
M. DAYLE JEFFS 




2 25, I'm disallowing. Again, I believe that it's a 
3 little too broad and the definition of substantial leaves 
4 something to be desired. 
5 The 26 and 27 that you've withdrawn, I had indicated 
6 that I was going to--to--to allow those in, so that--and then 
7 28, I am--I have disallowed also. 
8 MR. JEFFS: Thank you, your Honor. 
9 THE COURT: Any exceptions to be noted, Mr. Black? 
10 MR. BLACK, JR.: No, your Honor. 
11 THE COURT: I think that handles--
12 MR. JEFFS: There is one other matter. I submitted 
13 a set of preliminary instructions to the Court. There are, I 
14 think--
15 THE COURT: There are five of them? 
16 MR- JEFFS: --five of them in number there. They're 
17 virtually right out of Mugi as preliminary instructions. I 
18 would request the Court, as I did in'my request, that those be 
19 given to (sic) the Court after selection of the jury and 
20 before opening statements. 
I assume the Court, after the jury selection, will 





24 THE COURT: Another oath. 
25 MR. JEFFS: --15-minute recess to call their boss or 
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EXHIBIT G 
1 t h e - - t h e i s s u e s b e f o r e t h e Cour t? 
2 MR. DOWD: I ' l l t r y . 
3 THE COURT: Who was the next one? I think--
4 UNIDENTIFIED JUROR: My daughter was born there 
5 three years ago. 
6 THE COURT: Again, would you experience--
7 UNIDENTIFIED JUROR: It wouldn't. 
8 THE COURT: Doesn't dictate one way or the other 
9 that you would favor--
10 UNIDENTIFIED JUROR: No. 
11 THE COURT: Now, let me ask I guess, I think that we 
12 kind of covered this, but just out of an abundance of caution, 
13 we've asked whether you've had some relationship or if you 
14 know the parties and the witnesses and so forth, but--but 
15 have--have any of you acquired any information about the 
15 plaintiffs or the defendants which would--which would bias you 
17 either for or against Mr. and Mrs. Davis, the Allen Memorial 
18 Hospital or Dr. Murray? If anyone has acquired any 
19 information, would they raise their hand? I see that no hands 
20 are raised. I thought that we had pretty well covered that. 
21 Have--have any of you or a member of your immediate 
22 family or close acquaintance ever had a child die during or 
23 shortly after childbirth? If anyone has, would they raise 
24 their right hand. No hands are raised. 
25 Have you or a member of your family or close 
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8 
1 survived? 
2 MS. STANGLE: Yes. He's fine, 
3 THE COURT: Have any of the jurors been sued? 
4 Anyone raise your hand if you have. 
5 Have--has anyone close to you been sued? No one's 
5 raised their hands there. 
7 Have any of you been witnesses-' 
MR. JEFFS: The other half of that--the other half 
9 I of that question, your Honor, I'd ask would be, have any of 
10 them brought suit against anyone? You asked if they had been 
H sued, you didn't ask if they had brought a suit 
THE COURT: Okay. I'm sorry. Have--have any of you 
13 I brought suit against anybody? 
14 I UNIDENTIFIED JUROR: I settled an automotive claim, 
it was a lawsuit in Louisiana. 
15 I THE COURT: Involving an automobile accident? 
1 7 J UNIDENTIFIED JUROR: No, it was (inaudible) the car 
19 | backfired and a part blew off and hit my son on the forehead 









it was three years getting settled, it was settled the first 
of the year. 
THE COURT: But the fact that you've been involved 
in a lawsuit, does that fact bias you in favor or against a 
plaintiff or a defendant in this lawsuit? 
UNIDENTIFIED JUROR: I think not. I didn't have to 
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS £ 2 
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1 appear anyplace, it all took place in Louisiana and mine was 
2 I phone--phone participation. 
3 I THE COURT: I ^ ee. 
4 ] Have--I think that we've asked before. Have--I 
5 think that the only people that have had experience either 
g working in a hospital or--or in the professional capacity as 
7 a nurse, we've kind of gone at; but I haven't asked 
Q specifically. Have--have anyone--has anyone else actually 
9 worked in a hospital or had any experience? 
Do--do any of the jurors have any feelings either 
for or against somebody bringing a lawsuit alleging 







I--I didn't explain to the jury, but this is a civil 
action, malpractice is a civil action, it's not a criminal 
action and as such, you--you need to understand that and that-
-that it involves a claim of money damages and does not 
involve any kind of criminal punishment. Do all of the jury 
19 I understand that? 
2Q i You'll find out and we'll have a--some instructions 
21 I as to your overall obligations and so forth, but basically the 
jury is to determine the facts of the case, that's--that you 
listen to the witness and you determine the facts and then you 
apply the law which I will instruct you about at the end of 
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EXHIBIT H 
INDEX TO 
JURY VOIR DIRE QUESTIONS 
ASKED BY THE COURT 
In the transcript of the jury voir dire, (R. 548-628), the court asked prospective jurors 
questions on the following subjects: 
1. Relationships, occupation, employer, marital status, spouse's employer and marital status, 
children, significant information. (R. 566-70). 
2. Familiarity with the facts and circumstances of the case. (R. 571). 
3. Any relationship with the parties, counsel, or witnesses. (R. 572). 
4. Any debtor/creditor relationship. (R. 595). 
5. Ever served on a jury before. (R. 595). 
6. Ever been a patient at defendant Allen Memorial Hospital. (R. 598). 
7. Any jurors related to each other. (R. 591). 
8. Acquire any information regarding plaintiff or defendant which would cause bias for any 
of the parties. (R. 600). 
9. Ever had a child die during or shortly after childbirth. (R. 600). 
10. Ever been a patient at St. Mary's Hospital. (R. 601). 
11. Ever had an experience with premature birth. (R. 606). 
12. Ever been sued or brought suit against anyone. (R. 609). 
13. Ever worked in a hospital or similar experience. (R. 610). 
14. Feelings for or against someone bringing a malpractice action against their doctor or 
hospital. (R. 610). 
15. Explanation that this is a civil action not a criminal action involving money damages not 
punishment. (R. 610). 
16. Any reservations about accepting the instructions and applying the law. (R. 611). 
17. Anyone legally trained. (R. 611). 
18. Any scheduling conflicts. (R. 612). 
EXHIBIT I 
1 MR. NEWELL: Oh. No, no. 
2 THE COURT: --that you would have to believe him? 
3 He's been indicated that' he will be a witness in this matter; 
4 would--would your relationship make you tend--tend to make you 
5 believe him more than some other witness who is sworn and 
6 testifies here? 
7 MR. NEWELL: I--I think I'd believe Dr. Murray. 
8 THE COURT: You think that you would believe Dr. 
9 Murray above and beyond some other witness that you're not 
10 acquainted with? 
11 MR. NEWELL: Yes. 
12 THE COURT: You want to go further, Counsel, or do 
13 Y o u want to make any challenges as we go? 
14 MR. BLACK, JR.: I think Mr. Newell can be 
15 challenged for cause, based upon his statement that he would 
15 believe Dr. Murray's testimony over that of another witness'. 
17 I think that qualifies for cause, and I'd ask that he be 
18 excused. 
19 THE COURT: Mr. Jeffs? 
20 MR. JEFFS: I have no objection. 
2i THE COURT: I think under those circumstances, Mr. 
22 Newell, I think that you will, and I would--I guess I'll 
23 lecture you a little bit. When people come into Court, 
24 regardless of their personal connections and so forth, they're 
25 sworn to tell the truth. Now, it's true that some people don't 
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1 counsel for the defense have a--
2 MR. JEFFS: We would challenge him for cause. 
3 THE COURT: I think that's an appropriate challenge 
4 for cause, and we'll excuse--do you want--do you have any 
5 exception to--
6 MR. BLACK, JR.: No, your Honor. 
7 THE COURT: I'll excuse Mr. Dalphin. Ask the clerk 
8 to draw the next name. 
9 THE CLERK: Joseph Dowd. 
10 THE COURT: Mr. Dowd, tell us a little bit about 
11 yourself. 
12 MR- DOWD: My name is Newell Dowd. I'm retired. My 
13 wife and I (inaudible) I am the son of Mrs. Stocks, that's 
14 about the size of it, and we both wear hearing aids that may 
15 hinder the fact of what we hear is not exactly what's said, 
16 especially. 
17 THE COURT: Does--does the disability which you 
18 have, Mr. Dowd, do you think that that is going to affect you 
19 in such a fashion that you--you won't be able to hear the 
20 proceedings? You've been able to hear everything that's gone 
2i on so far, have you not? 
22 MR. DOWD: I have, remarkably so, I believe I've 
23 heard everything correctly, yes. 
24 THE COURT: Have--I guess I'm going to skip over 
25 that, for the time being, at any rate. You've heard the names 
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1 I THE COURT: Do you have any knowledge of this 
2 particular case? 
3 MR. BROOKS: No; I don't, but I feel that I would be 
4 biased because of my professional relationship with--
5 THE COURT: Make it extremely uncomfortable for you 
6 to bring in a verdict against one party or the other? 
7 MR. BROOKS: Yes. 
8 THE COURT: Cause objection? 
9 MR. BLACK, SR.: We challenge the jury--juror for 
10 cause, your Honor, based on his own statement. 
11 THE COURT: I think then, Mr. Brooks, you've brought 
12 that up twice, and I think the fact that you brought it up 
13 twice probably says that we'll excuse you this particular 
14 time. Again, if I forget, and I've done this already, to--
15 when I excuse somebody, it's--it's--it shouldn't be taken as 
16 any--as any kind of a condemnation or anything else, it's just 
17 one of those things that--that they happen. 
18 And I also want to thank people when they leave for 
19 being here in the first place, so I think, Mr. Brooks, I'll 
20 excuse you and we'll call another name. 
2i THE CLERK: Suzanne Stangle. 
22 THE COURT: You can just stay standing for a minute 
23 and tell us a little bit about yourself, Ms. Stangle, if you 
24 will, please. 
25 MS. STANGLE: My name is Suzanne Stangle. My 
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1 THE COURT: Kim Hardman. And I'11--kind of, you 
2 know, I--I use that fly in the soup analogy; but--but again, 
3 we haven't heard the fkcts in this case. Does--does this 
4 relationship which you have with these potential witnesses 
5 and/or the party, Dr. Murray, make it so that you would be for 
6 or against the--the position? 
7 MS. ENGELBRIGHT: As you've been questioning other 
8 people, I've asked myself that. I would hope not. I would 
9 try to be objective. 
10 THE COURT: Any challenge for cause? 
11 MR. BLACK, JR. : Well, based upon her statement that 
12 Kim Hardman is a good friend, I think that indicates a 
13 relationship of a friendship and--and trust, and I'm sure that 
14 Ms. Engelbright would try her best to be fair, but under the 
15 circumstances, I'm not sure that she could be; so we'd move 
16 for cause on her. 
17 MR. JEFFS: I don't think it satisfies the 
18 requirement of challenge for cause. 
19 
21 
THE COURT: Well, it's a close one, but I think that 
20 I'll excuse Ms. Engelbright in this particular case. 
Call another witness--or another juror, excuse me 
22 I THE CLERK: Marjorie Smith. 
23 | THE COURT: Before you sit down, Ms. Smith, will you 
24 I tell us a little bit about yourself? 
25 MS. SMITH: A 75-year-old widow. 
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1 I--I think that I'm going to excuse Ms. Stocks just 
2 on the basis of--of her ability to hear more than anything 
3 else, but we've got an additional reason where--where they are 
4 related, so on both those reasons, Ms. Stocks, I'm going to 
5 excuse you. Mr. Dowd, you have to stay, okay? 
5 MS. STOCKS: Thank you. 
7 THE COURT: Call the next juror. 
8 THE CLERK: B.D. Doherty. 
9 THE COURT: Ms. Doherty, will you take the seat up 
10 here, but before you sit down, tell us a little bit about you 
11 if you will, please. 
12 MS. DOHERTY: Yes. My husband and I are retired. 
13 We moved here about nine years ago from Boulder, Colorado, and 
14 we retired from our professions, I was a nurse and he was a 
15 physicist and we have three children. 
16 THE COURT: You may sit down. The fact that you're-
17 -that you were a nurse and have retired as a nurse, and this 
18 will involve testimony by nurses and doctors and people in the 
19 medical realm, does--does your experience, your employment 
go experience make it so it would be difficult for you to render 
2i a fair and impartial judgment in this case? 
22 MS. DOHERTY: No . 
23 THE COURT: And a g a i n , I t a k e i t t h a t y o u d i d n ' t 
24 h a v e p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h - - w i t h t h e p a r t i e s o r t h e 
25 w i t n e s s e s b e f o r e y o u - - I mean o t h e r t h a n s i n c e y o u ' v e come 
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EXHIBIT J 
1 those facts to the law whether or not there's--whether the 
2 decision is for or against the--the parties to the action. 
3 So, do--do any of you have any reservations about accepting my 
4 instructions and then applying the facts which you determine 
5 in the jury room to those instructions? 
6 No one has raised their hand. 
7 | Is anyone in the jury in--of the potential jury, 
8 jurors, legally trained or have any law training? No one has 
9 raised their hands. 
10 Have any of you worked in law offices or in a legal 
11 I capacity? 
Ms. Smith? I believe. 
13 I MS. SMITH: I worked for Elaine Matthews for awhile. 
14 THE COURT: Elaine Matthews is an attorney here 
15 locally. What period of time did that take place? 
i6 MS. SMITH: February of '92 to June of '92. 
17 THE COURT: For a short period of time. Would--
would your experience there bias you for or against any of the 
lawyers, or make it more difficult for you to--to evaluate the 
evidence that has been--that will be presented here? 
MS. SMITH: No. 






23 g e n t l e m e n ? 
24 MR. BLACK, SR. : I can't think of anything that your 
25 Honor has missed. 
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EXHIBIT K 
A8-The Times-Independent, Thursday, September 23,1993 
"Decision time" for hospital 
choices, Senior Citizens told 
Moab's senior citizens were told 
it's "decision time" for hospital 
choices at a luncheon held at the 
Senior Citizen Community Center 
Friday, Sept. 17. 
Hospital vice-chairman, Dixie 
Barksdale, presented a series of op-
tions Grand County property owners 
and residents will need to consider 
for continued operation of Allen 
Memorial Hospital in Moab. 
Those choices arc: 
• Choosing to re-authorize the 
hospital special service district tax-
ing authority where property owners 
share in the expenses of operating 
the medical services at Allen 
Memorial Hospital (this was defeated 
in the 1992 election); 
• Choosing to enact a one percent 
sales tax for continued operation of 
the hospital and other medical-related 
services in the county (this option 
would be shared by travelers using 
local facilities and shopping during 
vacation); 
• Asking the County Council to 
divert funds from its general fund to 
subsidize operations of the hospital; 
or, 
• Leasing, or selling the hospital 
to a private medical corporation op-
erating hospitals in larger areas. 
Both the taxing authority and the 
one percent sales tax initiative would 
need voter election. The extent of pa-
tient care and services provided as an 
acute care facility with a 24-hour 
emergency staff will also need to be 
scrutinized. The $2.8-million annual 
operating cost has been subsidized 
by a l/10th of one percent mill levy 
to property owners which ends this 
year. The subsidy has been about 
S200,000 each year. Operating rev-
enue in 1992 amounted to $2.6 mil-
lion. The sales tax measure could 
generate close to $1 million annu-
ally. Speculation about other emer-
gency services, such as search and 
rescue, free clinics and health educa-
tion programs has enhanced consid-
eration of that option. 
Barksdale, who was appointed to 
the .board in February, said she 
quickly learned factors that make the 
health care field uniquely different. 
"To make the best policy decisions, 
hospital board members need to un-
derstand the characteristics of manag-
ing a hospital. Policy or strategic 
decisions that do not consider the 
hospital's regulatory environment or 
support its special focus on patient 
care could erode the hospital's mis-
sion, and if day-to-day operational 
pressures, especially economic con-
straints, are given greater considera-
tion than the patient care, the conse-
quences can be disastrous," she said. 
"The public is more aware of 
health issues and, consequently, ex-
pectations arc raised. Most of us still 
don't completely understand the 
complexities of health care delivery, 
so when our expectations and lack of 
knowledge combine with our emo-
tions, many times misunderstand-
ings and dissatisfaction result," 
Barksdale added 
She pointed out that patient care is 
imperative. Other organizations can 
perform certain functions in private, 
but the hospital must provide care 
365 days a year, 24 hours a day—"all 
under the watchful eye of the press 
and the public " 
A few mistakes may be tolerated 
in other fields, but even the most 
minor error by a health care provider 
can prove fatal to a patient. 
Other factors affecting the delivery 
of care include the range of techno-
logical advancements in the health 
care field; an area expanding more 
and more rapidly. New services and 
new devices are constandy being in-
troduced, so in-service training to 
staff and the development or modifi-
cation of policies and procedures and 
contingency plans for equipment j 
malfunctions, for instance, arc in 
regular review. So is the specializa-
tion in staff. Partly in response to 
the increasingly sophisticated tech-
nology used in health care, practi-
tioners have become even more spe-
cialized. "The hometown family 
physician who delivered babies, re-
moved tonsils, performed appendec-
tomies, and became a part of the 
family, is almost extinct," Barksdale 
said She noted, "It's understandable 
that those of us who depended on our 
family doctor for all our medical and 
emotional needs arc experiencing 
frustration with today's trend to spe-
cialization." 
Seniors attending the luncheon 
voiced concern over rising costs in 
medical care due to malpractice suits, 
need for a local insurance like those 
operating in some states that have 
been considered successful, high 
staff-to-paticnt ratios, low hospital 
occupancy, and lack of continued in-
formation to the public about the 
needs and operations of the local 
hospital. One questioned the need for 
a hospital. And, one question di-
rected to Mayor Tom Stocks, con-
cerned the possibility of part of the 
Moab City local sales tax being 
earmarked for health care. 
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ROBERT O. MURRAY, M.D. and : 
GRAND COUNTY SERVICE AREA, : 
dba ALLEN MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, : 
Defendants. : 
: MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Civil No. 920700026 
: Judge Bruce K. Halliday 
The Court having received a Notice to Submit for Decision on 
Plaintiffs7 Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying Motion for 
New Trial, and having reviewed the pleadings, statutes, and case 
law submitted by the parties, now makes its findings and decision. 
Plaintiff has moved this Court to reconsider its ruling on 
Plaintiffs' Motion for a New Trial. Defendant has responded that 
a Motion for Reconsideration is not provided for under the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court is concerned about a Petition 
for Reconsideration and that concern is based upon the interest 
which all parties and the Court have in finality of decisions. 
However, here the Plaintiffs' filed their Motion for New Trial pro 
se and some deference may be allowable and/or the Motion for 
Reconsideration may be treated as an amended Motion for a New 
Trial. In the alternative, it may possibly be reviewed as a Rule 
2 
60 Motion provided the same is timely filed and/or adequate grounds 
thereunder exist. 
The Court has concluded to review Plaintiffs7 Motion for 
Reconsideration under one or both of the foregoing theories. 
However considered, the ultimate questions appear to be: 
1. Was there newly discovered evidence and/or 
2. Was that newly discovered evidence plain error or so 
prejudicial as to require this Court to order a new trial. 
The Court cannot find either newly discovered evidence, or 
evidence so prejudicial or so plainly erroneous that a new trial is 
justified. 
The conclusions which the Plaintiffs wish the Court to draw, 
to-wit, that the media blitz was unknown and must have had some 
detrimental effect upon the decision which the various jurors made 
with regard to this matter is just not sustained by any of the 
evidence herein. All of the newspaper articles submitted by 
Plaintiffs were known to or with reasonable diligence could have 
been known to Plaintiffs. Further, the Court cannot conclude that 
there exists any connection between Plaintiffs7 counsel's failure 
to inquire into those specific attitudes of the jury and a finding 
by the jury of no claim. Certainly I cannot conclude that there is 
clear error and it is certainly npt obvious to this Court that even 
assuming error, that it is harmful or prejudicial and that there is 
a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome to the 
3 
Plaintiffs or that the Courtis confidence in the verdict is 
undermined to any extent whatsoever. The verdict entered by the 
jury herein was a special verdict wherein they found no cause of 
action against the doctor as well as the hospital, although the 
hospital at the time of trial was the only party Defendant at risk. 
It clearly appears from the special verdict that no deliberations 
were made with regard to any amount of damages. Plaintiffs7 Motion 
and arguments assume that the overriding concern of the community 
was to retain the hospital at all "costs", even to the extent that 
randomly selected members of the community would not fairly 
deliberate with regard to Plaintiffs7 claim(s). However, as 
Plaintiffs7 exhibits show, the community had declined to support 
the hospital through tax increases, and therefore the contrary, 
opposite overriding concern, to-wit, to terminate the hospital7s 
existence, would be an equally logical assumption. 
The Court can clearly see that from the attachments of 
Plaintiffs7 to their application that they feel the community was 
prejudiced against them. The Court believes that appropriate 
inquiry was made into any such prejudice in the normal voir dire. 
Plaintiffs7 attempt to bootstrap their fear that a small community 
who knows everyone would be prejudiced against them into "clear 
error", and that such a community would protect the hospital and 
staff at all costs, fails. Their attempt to connect the publicity 
blitz to their claim of prejudice fails because any of a number of 
4 
possible alternatives to their explanation of the verdict is 
equally as likely an explanation and the most likely is that the 
jurors concluded that the doctor and the hospital had done all 
things possible under the circumstances. 
The grounds, whether considered under a Rule 59 Motion or even 
under a Rule 60 Motion to Set Aside the Verdict and Order a New 
Trial, requires the newly discovered evidence to be material which 
could not, with reasonable diligence, have been discovered and 
produced at trial. The same is true under a Rule 60 Motion but 
even more restrictively since there the newly discovered evidence 
must be such that by due diligence could not have been discovered 
in time to move for the new trial under Rule 59(b). 
The conclusions which the Court therefore draws is: 
1. That the material was in fact available, the 
information was available and due diligence would have disclosed 
same. 
2. Even assuming arguendo that the material was not 
available and is newly discovered and would qualify, the Court 
cannot find that either clear error or prejudice to the Plaintiffs 
existed as a result of counsel and the Court's failure to inquire 
into the particular attitudes of jurors with regard to the 
information published in the various newspaper reports. 
Plaintiffs7 pleadings, arguments and case law do not substantiate 
5 
this Court finding any such nexus between the alleged error and/or 
prejudice to the Defendant and the verdict seems to clearly weigh 
against any such finding. 
For and on account of the foregoing the Court hereby denies 
Plaintiffs' Motion f or\Reconsiderat:j/)n 
DATED this / £ day of , 1994. 
BRUCE K. HALLIDA^ 
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:or or against anyone in the--that would testify 
there? 
Stangle? 
STANGLE: About four years ago, I had some in-
there, I don't think that would affect my 
COURT: And you said how long ago, again? 
STANGLE: About four years ago. 
COURT: Four years ago? 
Davis? 
STANGLE: Or out-patient. 
DAVIS: One of my children were born there and 
my husband was there twice. And it wouldn't affect my 
judgment at a 
THE 
11. 








SMITH: Not that I recall. 
COURT: Pardon me? 
SMITH: Not that I recall. 
COURT: I--I think that, Mr. Jeffs, that I've--
well handled the remainder of your requested 
unless you have some specific inquiry that you 1 
wish for me to make. 
MR. JEFFS: You may be going to ask this question 
already. I wanted to know if any of them, a close member of 
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1 their family, immediate family or a close acquaintance that 
2 has had a--the birth of a premature child, premature birth, 
3 | and whether that would affect their ability to be fair and 
4 I impartial 
5 THE COURT: Have--have any of the potential jurors 
5 had an experience or had a close acquaintance have an 
7 experience with a premature birth? Let me just ask it that 
8 w aY • 
9 J Let's start up here. 
UNIDENTIFIED JUROR: I had a daughter that was born 10 












assistance. He slept in the same room and kept her alive, 
13 she's alive today. 
THE COURT: Does that experience--would that 
15 experience make it so that you would tend to favor of disfavor 
one of the parties, either of the parties, the parties 
plaintiff or the parties in this action? It involves a 
different doctor, but it may involve the same hospital. 
That's what I'm--I guess I'm inquiring. Does the--does the 
fact that you had that good experience and you have a 
21 daughter, would that make it so that you couldn't fairly and 
impartially try the issues that--
UNIDENTIFIED JUROR: I don't think so. 
THE COURT: --Mr. and Mrs. Davis bring before this 
Court? 
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